Experimental evidence on english auctions: oral outcry versus clock

Ricardo Gonçalves*, John Hey

*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisarevisão de pares

Resumo

This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an oral outcry auction where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not affect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction. Although interesting and encouraging, the results clearly indicate that further research is necessary, particularly with a modified experimental design.
Idioma originalEnglish
Título da publicação do anfitriãoExperiments in economics
Subtítulo da publicação do anfitriãodecision making and markets
EditoresJohn D. Hey
EditoraWorld Scientific Publishing Co.
Páginas427-466
Número de páginas40
ISBN (eletrónico)9789813235816, 9789813235823
ISBN (impresso)9789813235809
Estado da publicaçãoPublished - 1 jan 2018

Impressão digital

Mergulhe nos tópicos de investigação de “Experimental evidence on english auctions: oral outcry versus clock“. Em conjunto formam uma impressão digital única.

Citação