Is there a place for God after the phenomenological reduction? Husserl and philosophical theology

My purpose in this paper is to determine if there is still a place for God, in Husserl’s phenomenology, after the achievement of the phenomenological reduction. There are several different ways to address this issue. One can begin by asserting that there is no place in phenomenology, after bracketing the natural world of our lived experience, for any transcendence that is not, either the transcendence of the noema regarding the stream of consciousness in which it was generated, or the worldly or mundane transcendence. One can also stress that the absolute consciousness that constitutes all kinds of objectivities – real or ideal – cannot tolerate at his side another absolute like the Christian God. Against these views, one can oppose the following: 1) in the intersubjective experience, the process of constitution of its specific noemata – the alter egos – goes beyond what seemed admissible in the standard intentional analysis of the process of constitution of worldly objectivities; 2) intentional consciousness shows an overall teleological structure that points beyond the simply given. In this paper, I try to explore the possibilities this opens in the core of intentional analysis to a phenomenological approach to God.