Learning in bank runs

Eva Schliephake; Joel Shapiro

Learning in bank runs

Eva Schliephake^*, Joel Shapiro

^*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisa

1 Transferências (Pure)

Resumo

We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.

Idioma original	English
Editora	Centre for Economic Policy Research
Estado da publicação	Publicado - 26 set. 2021

Série de publicação

Nome	CEPR Discussion Paper
N.º	DP16581
ISSN (eletrónico)	0265-8003

Acesso ao documento

94660416Final published version, 2,63 MBLicença: Unspecified

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/47027Licença: Unspecified

CUBE: Católica Lisbon Research Unit in Business and Economics
Machado, F. (PI), Aranda, A. M. (Investigador), Costa, A. I. D. A. (Investigador), Martins, A. P. (Investigador), Bernard, A. (Investigador), Fidalgo, A. (Investigador), Reis, C. (Investigador), Abecassis-Moedas, C. (Investigador), Santos, C. (Investigador), Tran, D. (Investigador), Fernandes, D. (Investigador), Bonfim, D. (Investigador), Schliephake, E. (Investigador), Kalogirou, F. (Investigador), Reis, F. (Investigador), Santos, F. (Investigador), Machado, F. (Investigador), Sguera, F. (Investigador), Cerqueiro, G. (Investigador), Reis, H. (Investigador), Barreto, I. (Investigador), Silva, J. (Investigador), Salvado, J. C. (Investigador), Neves, J. C. D. (Investigador), Gijsbrechts, J. (Investigador), Stahl, J. (Investigador), Guedes, J. C. (Investigador), Faias, J. (Investigador), Wagner, L. (Investigador), Correia, I. (Investigador), Saldanha, M. F. (Investigador), Fontes, J. C. (Investigador), Modesto, L. (Investigador), Meira, M. (Investigador), Matos, M. G. D. (Investigador), Gouveia, M. (Investigador), Kozeniauskas, N. (Investigador), Bertani, N. (Investigador), Couzoff, P. (Investigador), Barroso, P. (Investigador), Encarnação, P. (Investigador), Raposo, P. (Investigador), Teles, P. (Investigador), Bastos, W. (Investigador), Bohnsack, R. (Investigador), Vale, R. C. D. (Investigador), Ferreira, R. (Investigador), Lloyd-Braga, T. (Investigador), Ramus, T. (Investigador), Colaço, V. H. (Investigador), Cavicchini, A. (Investigador), Parada, P. (Investigador), Pieters, R. (Investigador), Pinto, F. A. G. D. L. S. (Investigador), Colaço, V. H. (Investigador) & Venter, Z. (Investigador)
1/01/20 → 31/12/25
Projeto

Citação

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title = "Learning in bank runs",

abstract = "We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.",

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AB - We examine a model in which depositor learning exacerbates bank runs. Informed depositors can quickly withdraw when the bank has low-quality assets. Uninformed depositors may decide to wait, which allows them to learn by observing informed depositors' actions. However, learning that the bank has low-quality assets will spark a run ex-post, which increases the incentives of uninformed depositors to run ex-ante. Moreover, when there are more informed depositors, uninformed depositors have a fear of missing out, which also makes preemptive runs more likely. Learning may, thus, increase the likelihood of panic runs and decrease surplus.

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Learning in bank runs

Resumo

Série de publicação

Acesso ao documento

Impressão digital

Projetos

CUBE: Católica Lisbon Research Unit in Business and Economics

Citação