Majority rule and the public provision of a private good

Miguel Gouveia*

*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisarevisão de pares

91 Citações (Scopus)

Resumo

This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's Law of Income Redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn. * On leave from the University of Pennsylvania. I thank Marcus Berliant, Tim Besley and Steve Coate for very helpful comments and the Penn Research Foundation for financial support.
Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (de-até)221-244
Número de páginas24
RevistaPublic Choice
Volume93
Número de emissão3-4
DOIs
Estado da publicaçãoPublished - 1997
Publicado externamenteSim

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