On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

Fernando Branco

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

Fernando Branco^*

^*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisa › revisão de pares

6 Citações (Scopus)

Resumo

I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency.

Idioma original	English
Páginas (de-até)	187-194
Número de páginas	8
Revista	Economics Letters
Volume	70
Número de emissão	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2
Estado da publicação	Publicado - fev. 2001

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10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

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Citação

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title = "On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction",

abstract = "I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency.",

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author = "Fernando Branco",

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AB - I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency.

KW - D44

KW - FCC auctions

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0035578720

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

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AN - SCOPUS:0035578720

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VL - 70

SP - 187

EP - 194

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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ER -

On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

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