Propositional attitudes and embodied skills in the philosophy of action

William Hasselberger*

*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisarevisão de pares

2 Citações (Scopus)

Resumo

Propositionalism in the philosophy of action is the popular view that intentional actions are bodily movements caused and rationalized by certain ‘internal’ propositional attitude states that constitute the agent's perspective. I attack propositionalism's background claim that the genuinely mental/cognitive dimension of human action resides solely in some range of ‘internal’ agency-conferring representational states that causally trigger, and thus are always conceptually disentangle-able from, bodily activity itself. My opposing claim, following Ryle, Wittgenstein, and others, is that mentality and intentionality can be constitutively implicated in bodily actions themselves, as exercises of a distinctive form of embodied practical understanding. I attempt to show this by attending to the fine-grained contours of various skillful actions.
Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (de-até)449-476
Número de páginas28
RevistaEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume26
Número de emissão1
DOIs
Estado da publicaçãoPublished - mar 2018

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