In this paper, we attempt to show how phenomenology, in a traditional methodological form, can provide an interesting and novel basis for thinking about screens in a world where screens now pervade a great many aspects of human experience. In our analysis, we aim to give a phenomenological account of screen(ing), that is, of its fundamental and foundational meaning. In doing the phenomenological analysis, we ground our argument on the ontology of Heidegger's Being and Time. In doing this, we claim that the screen will only show itself, as that which it is, as a screen in-the-world, where screens already are or have their being 'as screens' for this and that purpose, activity or work. We claim, and aim to show, that our analysis provides many insights about the meaning of screens that would be difficult to gain through any other method of investigation. We also argue and show that, although our method is not empirical, its results have important implications for the empirical world.