

The Catholic, the capitalist and the post-communist: three leaders rewritten in the Portuguese newspaper *Diário de Notícias* – Márcia Dias Sousa (CECC/ UCP)

Abstract

Every year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) serves as a global forum for the reflection about peace and human progress. The importance of this event is usually reflected on the member States' media, in which not only the nation's representative is considered newsworthy, but also major world leaders and/or others related with issues on the international agenda. In 1995 and in 2015, three heads of different ideologies who delivered a speech at the UNGA were considered newsworthy by the prestigious Portuguese newspaper *Diário de Notícias*: the Pope, as supreme leader of Catholicism; the President of the United States, as the main representative of capitalism; and the President of the Russian Federation, as the main head of post-communism since the fall of the Iron Curtain. We would argue that the editorial choices taken on the rewriting of each of these UNGA speeches reflected more than the international relevancy of the leaders and their messages; rather, that they were influenced by historical factors, ultimately contributing for the perpetuation of cultural models among the general public.

Keywords: news rewriting, Catholicism, capitalism, post-communism, cultural models.

1. Introduction

On its website, the UN explains that “[t]he General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All 193 Member States of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the only UN body with *universal* representation” (United Nations, 2019; my emphasis). Therefore, and taking into account the main aims defined by the founders of the organization in San Francisco, back in 1945 – from which “to practice tolerance and live *together* in peace”, “to unite our strength to maintain *international* peace and security”, “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the *common* interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of *all* peoples” (*ibid.*, 1945; my emphasis) –, we may consider the annual UNGA session (or an urgent meeting) as a global arena where the main world leaders discuss the most important issues concerning the international life at the time. Therefore, the UNGA is “always an important moment to acknowledge the political guidelines of the main world leaders (...), as well as to understand which issues will be dominating the international agenda in the [near] future” (Sá, 2019; my translation). This is why, in each of the member states, the media tend to consider the leaders' speeches newsworthy – i.e., “interesting or important enough to be included in a news report” (Rundell, 2007: 1007).

Diário de Notícias (DN) is one of the most prestigious newspapers in Portugal. When it was founded, in the 19th century, it changed the path of the Portuguese press thanks to the new model of production and distribution it promoted: it was established as a wide circulation newspaper which reached vast groups of the population, and it became an icon on the so-called “serious”, “quality” journalism – a kind of news making characterized by an attention given to subjects such as Politics, Economy and Culture (aimed to more educated readers and with a higher economic level, as well as more qualified advertising), instead of popular, tabloid-like issues (cf. Figueira, 2012: 70; Ferreira, 2019). In this study, we wish to analyse how such an important newspaper in the Portuguese context has conveyed three ideologically different UNGA speeches, in two specific moments: the celebrations of the 50th and 70th anniversary of the UN – in 1995 and 2015, respectively. More precisely, we will seek to understand which concerns were associated to the main leaders of Catholicism, Western capitalism and post-communism (i.e., post-Cold War Russia) in both occasions: in 1995, Pope John Paul II, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin; in 2015, Pope Francis, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin. We will also verify whether the verbs chosen to introduce the direct or indirect speech helped to convey a specific perspective about the concerns promoted in each case.

In both, the UNGA will be considered as the source context and the three leaders as the source agents. On the other hand, the Portuguese society will be taken as the target context and DN as the target agent. Methodologically, we will consider Julie D’Acci’s circuit of media studies (cf. 2004) – which presents as one of its fundamental basis Stuart Hall’s encoding-decoding model on media (re)production (cf. Hall, 1980) – and we will associate it to José Lambert and Hendrik van Gorp’s systemic-systematic model of translation (cf. 1985). The aim will be to identify which correlation can be traced between the editorial choices made and historical factors involving both contexts. Ultimately, we will seek to understand in what sense the choices might have contributed to the diffusion of particular cultural models of global leadership within the Portuguese society in recent History. To this, we will assume the premise of D’Acci’s model that any cultural artefact (say, a news piece) circulates in a given context in a continuous connection between production and reception, and that both processes are determined by a specific sociohistorical context. Moreover, we will uphold Lambert and van Gorp’s notion of translation as a cultural act, in the sense that it results from crossed relations between

authors (i.e., agents), texts and readers, all engaged in a polysystem necessarily determined by the cultural intersections. In what concerns the theoretical frame, the process of conveying the leaders' speeches in the press will be considered as *rewriting* and rewriting as an act of *translation*: first, because “[t]ranslation is, of course, a rewriting of an original text” (Lefevere, 1992: vii); second, because translation does not simply occur between two (or more) languages, but between two (or more) cultures and, so, “whatever their intention, [any translation] reflect a certain ideology” so that the rewritten text may “function in a given society in a given way” (*ibid.*). In turn, by “ideology” we mean sets of moral values that are shared by the members of a particular group or a society in the whole, which are manifested in practice by specific modes of behaviour [cf. Althusser, 2004 (1970)]. And that is why we consider the Pope and both the Presidents of the US and the Russian Federation as agents who are *the* major representatives of the models of thought (i.e., ideologies) that sustain their respective institutions and upon which they fundament their beliefs and actions – thus, what they have manifested once at the UNGA sessions.

Thus, we will seek to confirm the following hypothesis: had DN represented the three leaders according to a specific (thus, different) position and/or influence in the international sphere, we may infer that, in the Portuguese context, the news articles produced about the leaders' participation in the UNGA in two major moments of History not only transmitted main arguments of theirs, but also promoted a cultural view of each of the three ideologies. This being confirmed, we would be led to consider the diffusion of specific ideological models of thought as a news making product that would have contributed to “smooth” the sense of *uncertainty* of living in the necessarily inconstant (thus, *uncertain*) global village (cf. Bielsa and Bassnett, 2009: 18s; Giddens, 1990: 31), which ultimately would mean that “media texts do not merely ‘mirror realities’ as is sometimes naively assumed; [rather,] they constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them” (Fairclough, 1995: 103-104). All in all, we will develop this study considering that the cultural encounter between the source and target contexts provided by translation in the news field would allow us to discern how, in the Portuguese society, the characterization of major global agents contributed (or not) for a distinction of the “Us” from the “Other”.

2. DN and the newsworthiness of world leaders speaking before the UNGA

The current assistant director of DN, Leonídio Paulo Ferreira, in a recent interview conducted specifically for the purpose of the PhD thesis in which this study is integrated, said the following about the newsworthiness of the Pope while a speaker at the UNGA when compared to governmental UN members:

If [the Pope's speech] coincides [with the leaders'] – in September/ October, when the speeches occur – then, there is great competition in terms of newsworthiness. Because, besides what the President of the US, the President of China, the President of Russia are going to say, there are also all those leaders that, at the moment, are news. It might [have been] Hugo Chávez in Venezuela; it might be Assad in Syria... In that case, there is also a great competition among who is protagonist and the Pope does not stand out as clearly as one could assume ... For as much as the world might be agitated at the moment, the Pope's speech would hardly be considered as the most important in the agenda. (Ferreira, 2019; my translation).

In this study, we decided to focus on the agents rather than on the institutions, considering that, even though in the UNGA each speaker gives voice to the whole system he/she is representing, his/her status (and his/her charisma) is a fundamental reason for the public's interest about what he/she will say once on that international assembly – which is in line with what Leonídio Paulo Ferreira explained above. Yet, we consider that such a statement is only partial, for it is based exclusively on a pragmatic point of view of making news. Choices of whose speeches to rewrite and of what to highlight would result from the *conscious* dimension of the process, mainly defined according to “the conflicts happening at the moment” (Ferreira, 2019). However, we believe that there is also an *unconscious* part on the process of rewriting: editorial choices, such as the subjects associated to the source agents or the verbs preferred to introduce the (in)direct speech, might also reflect previously incorporated views of the reality that news (re)writers are not usually aware of. That would happen, first, because the news agents are part of the sociocultural target context in which both the production and the reception of the rewritten speeches occur; second, because they are part of one specific subsystem of that community, in this case occupied by DN, as a member of the Portuguese press. This means that directors and reporters are simultaneously journalists and citizens, who have been integrated in both (sub)systems through processes of socialization – more precisely, by an osmosis of the values and world views defined in each (or in both). This means that there is an interdependency between the mental values and the practical behaviours, thus between believing and behaving [cf. Breed, 1955: 328; Althusser, 2004 (1970): 43].

With this in mind, we must look critically to Leonídio Paulo Ferreira's statement about journalists' neutrality on treating all types of information and world agents. We should understand it not in a literal sense, but while an effort on the part of news professionals for not allowing their personal opinions and backgrounds to interfere with their rewriting processes – i.e., with the way they interpret (and promote further interpretation by the general public of) global events and protagonists. We do not consider possible to separate both spheres – the sociocultural and the professional – because, ultimately, news and translation (and translation in the news) are cultural processes made by humans, about humans, to humans. This is why we will seek to identify in this study indicators that could shed light on the influence of intrinsic values and world views in the processes of making news through rewritings of ideological speeches.

3. Portugal, Catholicism, capitalism and (post-)communism: some historical ties

In a country like Portugal, we may generally characterize the influence of the three ideologies as follows: since the democratic revolution in mid-70s, Portugal opened its doors to the world (cf. Ferreira, 2007: 308), more precisely to Europe and to the West. The effects did not circumscribe to politics, say the establishment of freedom as a core principle of everyday life. They were not exclusive to the financial and economic sectors either, as noticed in the intense industrialization and rapid growth of the Portuguese economy since the integration on the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1986 (cf. Reis, 2013: 145). Rather, from 1974 on, Portugal has experienced a period of very considerable change due to a confluence of factors which ultimately resulted in sociocultural modifications. We may highlight demographic changes, caused by either emigration and immigration, or by internal migrant flows from rural regions to the metropolises, which would turn the Portuguese society considerably more diversified in sociological terms – for instance, in religion, for the progressive coexistence of different beliefs and practices (cf. Teixeira, 2019: 96). However, if it is true that, as time went by, Portugal has seen the Catholic Church's authority diminish as a fundamental institution, Catholicism has remained the main religion established in the country. As Alfredo Teixeira claims, “the trajectories of change, via processes of detraditionalization and individualization, were accelerated by the political democratization implemented since 1974, by the integration of populational post-colonial fluxes, and by the integration on the European Community”, but all this did not translate into a “a religious distress” (*ibid.*: 95).

On the contrary, “the Portuguese 20th century was still marked by the structures of the traditional religiosity” and even though the Catholic symbolism has been showing signs of diverse modification, they represent a plasticity that belongs to the so-called “God of our homeland” (*ibid*: 93).

If we look into the period prior to the 1974 revolution, when António de Oliveira de Salazar was in power, we realize that the implementation of Catholicism as part of the Portuguese identity already had roots in the political ideology of the regime. One of the main principles of Salazar was “Portuguese, therefore Catholic”, an idea integrated in the propaganda of the regime and a strong basis of the whole ideological spectrum of his governance. Indeed, while the Second World War was devastating Europe, internally, “the political and Catholic institutions became concentric” (Teixeira, 2015: 61): because the Portuguese people was highly illiterate, it gave Salazar a very fertile ground to expand the roots of his political (and sociocultural) ideals. Thus, defending that “politically, it only exists what the public knows that exists” («Politicamente só existe o que o povo sabe que existe»),¹ Salazar took advantage of the general public’s inability to read or, at least, to have contact with ideas other than that promoted by the regime, so that he could, on the one hand, safeguard his political authority and, on the other hand, promote a sense of unitarian identity among all members of the society. In this way, the “Catholic morality was appropriate, as a spiritual foundation, for Salazar’s disciplinary power”, working for the benefit of the aimed “patriotism-making” project (Teixeira, 2015: 61). We believe that such an ideological background ought to have played a major impact on the perpetuation of Catholicism as the main religious tradition settled in the country until today, being especially relevant that, in a secular age such as that today, this religious preference is no longer fomented through political aims and pressure; rather by individual choices that manifest the influence of cultural roots in its fundamentals. And that is why this “new” kind of Catholicism is considered “cultural” (cf. *id.*, 2019: 59).

Also in Estado Novo may we find background for the image promoted of external countries and ideologies. Both liberalism (together with capitalism) and communism were considered first-line enemies of the regime, for Salazar’s Right-wing policies did not allow any room for Left-wing policies, nor for individual or private empowerment. We may associate the former directly to the US: liberalism is “deeply rooted in American soil, so

¹ Said by Salazar during the ceremony in which the national propaganda secretariat (Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional) was established, on September 26th, 1933.

much so that in the years after World War II, many historians and social scientists regarded the liberal project and the American civic creed as more or less the same.” (Starr, 2007: 34). Then, since “liberalism tends to prioritize individual liberty, privacy, commerce, competition, and shuns too much intimacy and collective action” (McCool, 2019: 13), we may define it as a political ideology upon which is settled the capitalist economic system, “in which property, businesses, and industry are owned by individual people and not by the government” (Rundell, 2007: 212). Finally, the notion that “[one] could be happy and fully self-developed on his own” (McCool, 2019: 166) is, at its core, central to capitalism, and, ultimately, is what lies behind the so-called “American dream”: the idea that the US is a country where anyone can become successful and ascend in social mobility through hard (individual) work (cf. Rundell, 2007: 46) and, by extension, that the President of the US is a kind of Achilles of contemporary History, in the sense that he is seen (and, according to Ruth Wodak, shown by the media) as “a wise man who is able of solving the huge problems of a complex world” [2011 (2009): 161].

It is not difficult to understand that all this conception of the United States was taught during the dictatorship period as belonging not to the “Us” but to the “Other”. Yet, in this case, it was an “Other” who was not as distant as the communist one. Indeed, History would determine a closer approach to the US than to the URSS/ Russia – and long before the end of Estado Novo. In fact, still during the Second World War, the geopolitics of Portugal was in itself a factor which approximated both countries, for the archipelago of the Azores, in the Atlantic Ocean, proved to be determinant for the US intervention in the European front (cf. Schmidt, 2013: 84-85; Tiago Moreira de Sá in Bastos, 2016). Then, despite the tension raised during the first decades after the war due to the regime’s African colonies which violated the UN’s aim of putting an end to all colonial processes in the continent (cf. Schmidt, 2013: 84), shortly after the Portuguese democratic revolution occurred Washington manifested a very strong support to Portugal’s aim of implementing a democratic regime, striving to guide it towards a straight alignment with the West. Such a commitment was based on the ideas of a “shared geopolitical environment” and of “transnational ties”, mainly with Europe, thus not so much with an interest in the country itself, but due to the international environment at the time: the Cold War and the fierce opposition to the communist influence worldwide (cf. Sá, 2012: 35s; my translation).

To all this we need to add the very significant economic and sociocultural ties established with the US by means of the Portuguese emigration to this country during the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, the “American dream” was an ideology which gathered large enthusiasm particularly among rural populations, such as those from Northern Portugal and the Azores (cf. Rocha *et al.*, 2011: 51). In the US, a large emigrant community was established and with it strong chains of exchange of goods and financial capital. Such chains not only provided for the progress of both those who left and managed to prosper in the capitalist system, and of those who stayed in the homeland, who received parts of the income of the former. In the whole, the US became more than *the* land of opportunities: it became a sociocultural context with which very significant familiar, emotional ties were created and that exists still today (*ibid.*: 65).

In what concerns the former URSS and today’s Russia, no similar ties have been created. On the contrary, we may say that, throughout recent History, it was fomented an ideological detachment from communism in general through a confluence of factors – and that seems to have been perpetuated in the post-Berlin Wall era. The most immediate concerns to the political opposition determined by Salazar, which was considerably harsher than that verified with the capitalist system: Salazar believed that communism was a serious threat mainly to small, unstable economical-political systems (as it was Portugal) and that the Soviet communism, in particular, was *the* main enemy of the regime, mainly due to its ability to create a cohesive ideological system wherever it was established – a situation designated by Salazar as “the integral socialism” of the Soviets, which, to the Portuguese Prime-minister, was fundamental for the communist regime to impose its sovereignty over (at least part of) the world (cf. Reis, 2019: 413-414). Then, the strong historical relation of the Portuguese community with the Catholic Church might also helped to sustain such an opposition – this time, motivated by the religious faith. Even though the Church fomented an inter-religious dialogue, particularly since the Second Vatican Council, every religion besides the one that covers most of the population is usually considered the “Other”. A main reason for this relies on the fact that religious faith is a fundamental part of a nation’s identity, thus what is at stake is a comparison (or distinction) between who shares or not the same religious belief – a perspective that has motivated several conflicts around the globe, as it happened, for instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cultural differences between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croatians

and Muslim “Bosniacs” gave rise to almost four years of conflict in early-nineties (cf. Santos, 2015). The ties fomented with the US, precisely with the great intention of avoiding a communist influence over the country, also contributed decisively for the positioning of Portugal in the West not just in geographical terms, but mainly in ideological and political ones. Finally, the fact that, “[i]n communism, a violent revolution in which the workers rise up against the middle and upper classes is seen as an inevitable part of achieving a pure communist state” (Pruitt, 2019) also stands as an indicator of difference and, so, contributing for the consideration of this ideological context opposed to the definition of the “Us”.

4. 1995: Pope John Paul II, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin’s speeches at the UNGA

For the purpose of this study, we will consider the inverted pyramid as the structure based on which DN ought to have organized its article. Its assistant director confirmed that it has historically been the format followed by the press in general since the 19th century, as well as it is still today fundamental in the news agencies texts (Ferreira, 2019). Despite that today, the broad, easy access from the public to many different sources has imposed changes on news media – which may result, for instance, to begin the article with information other than the essential content, in an effort to establish a difference with the newspaper’s competitors’ approach –, in general, we may say that the inverted pyramid is still very present in the news (re)writing (*ibid.*).

In what concerns the article produced about POPE JOHN PAUL II’s UNGA speech, it is noticeable that, for DN, there was a fundamental argument: the pontiff’s appeal to the UN representatives towards the creation of a document similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) capable of safeguarding the rights of nations, just as the UDHR has been doing since 1948 on the individual level. This argument was promoted in the photo caption on the front-cover («João Paulo II **apelou** ontem na Assembleia Geral da ONU (...) à elaboração de uma carta dos direitos das nações que responda aos desafios dos tempos modernos»), on the head title inside the edition («**Defesa** dos direitos das nações»), on the lead («O Papa João Paulo II **apelou** ontem em Nova Iorque para as Nações Unidas, no sentido de ser elaborado sem demora um documento sobre os ‘direitos das nações’ com a finalidade de responder aos desafios do nacionalismo, nascidos dos escombros do Muro de Berlim») and on paragraph one («‘A Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem, adoptada em 1948, tratou de uma forma eloquente os direitos das pessoas, mas ainda não

existe direito internacional análogo que trate dos direitos das nações no seu conjunto’, **declarou** o Papa na tribuna da Assembleia Geral da ONU»). Moreover, the following paragraphs were also related to this subject, even if in some cases indirectly: it was related to the pontiff’s claims about the need to pay attention to the urgent questions regarding justice and freedom that were arising in the contemporary, post-Cold War world («‘É este facto que convém tomar atentamente em consideração, dadas as questões urgentes que ele suscita no mundo contemporâneo em relação à justiça e à liberdade’, **acrescentou** João Paulo II»); about the need to avoid repeating the mistakes made in the past and to implement a just world order (‘É ‘indispensável’ reflectir acerca do conceito de nação ‘no caso de se pretender evitar os erros do passado e instaurar uma ordem mundial justa’, **declarou** o Sumo Pontífice»); and about no one’s supremacy to deny a nation’s right to exist («O direito de uma nação à existência é ‘certamente anterior aos seus outros direitos: ninguém - nem um Estado, nem qualquer outra nação, nem uma organização internacional - se atreveu nunca a considerar que uma determinada nação não seria digna de existir’, **afirmou**»), which DN then mentioned as being an argument of the Pope associated to Bosnia-Herzegovina – on the one hand, taking into account the Pope’s indication that such a right exists even when a nation is not a governmental State («Mas ‘este direito fundamental à existência não significa necessariamente uma autoridade estatal’, **sublinhou** o Papa, sem mencionar explicitamente os diferentes povos que compõem, nomeadamente, a Bósnia-Herzegovina»); and, on the other hand, his blame of “the spiral of violence” taken by “unscrupulous” persons who martyred the Bosnian people just because they were deemed the Other («**Evocou**, no entanto, as ‘populações martirizadas’ da Bósnia, **ao denunciar com vigor** a ‘espiral de violência’ quando a realidade do outro é negada, nomeadamente devido a ‘manipulações de personagens sem escrúpulos’»), while there should have been fomented a peaceful environment based on everyone’s duty to respect other nations («Neste contexto, as nações têm certos direitos, e também deveres. ‘O primeiro de todos é certamente o dever de viver numa disposição pacífica, respeitosa e solidária em relação às outras nações’, **acrescentou** o Sumo Pontífice»). Thus, we are lead to consider that the urgency of creating juridical international means to avoid new threats to the stability of a nation, as it was exemplified by Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict at the time, was, indeed, the core of the target version of John Paul II’s speech produced by DN to the Portuguese public. The current associated director of the newspaper confirmed that,

because “95 was the year when, finally, it was found a solution (...) to Bosnia, it was expectable that the Pope would talk about Yugoslavia” (Ferreira, 2019; my translation). Therefore, even if he had referred to “many other issues, that one would be editorially highlighted”, for it was determinately present in the international agenda (*ibid.*).² All in all, and looking to the verbs used to introduce the direct/ indirect speech (signalled in bold), we discern a portrayal of the Pope as an attentive adviser of the member-States (“to declare”, “to add”, “to affirm”), but also as someone who propels them to act (“to appeal”, “to defend”, “to underline”), while denouncing major problems in the world, in a negative tone (“to evoke – vigorously denouncing”). Thus, as an agent simultaneously spiritual and political.

In what concerns BILL CLINTON, we notice that, in a general article about the UN’s fiftieth anniversary, among all the world leaders, he was the only one to whom DN dedicated two paragraphs – while to the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin; to the Head of the Cuban State, Fidel Castro; to the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat; and even to the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it dedicated only one paragraph of its news piece. Such a prevalence of the US leader among all the others – who were, nonetheless, newsworthy in this newspaper – would not have happened by chance. On the contrary, we believe that it shows a stronger relevancy of the US President at the most important international gathering of world representatives in the end of the century – an instance that we believe it is, in itself, a relevant indicator on the rewriting process pursued in a prestigious Portuguese newspaper, such as DN. In what concerns the subjects promoted, in those two paragraphs DN chose to present, among all what the US President told to his counterparts, a counterattack to the UN Secretary-General’s claim about the members’ failure on keeping their commitment to financially support the organization’s peace missions. Indeed, DN started the paragraph explicitly indicating the US President as one of Boutros-Ghali main targets («Um dos principais visados, o Presidente americano Bill Clinton, cujo país, só pela sua parte, deve mil milhões de dólares à organização internacional»), then rewriting Clinton’s opinion about the current state of affairs of the organization: that the UN should be reformed and that it should be

² In the lower levels of the inverted pyramid, the rewritten arguments of the Pope were related to: the condemnation of the politics of utilitarianism, especially economic; an appeal for an ethics of solidarity in the economic international scene; for an elevation of the UN from the status of “cold administrative institution to a moral centre” and a “family of nations”; to follow the example of the peaceful revolutions of 1989 and assume the risk of solidarity and peace; to conquer the fear of/ for the future, only possible if standing together; and the Pope’s support for the UN.

able to do more with less money («as Nações Unidas devem reformar-se e ‘fazer mais com menos’ dinheiro»). Yet, even though the verb chosen was rather “neutral” (“to declare” - «**declarou**»), in the sense that, alone, it would not promote a specific position of the US President, in the whole, the rewritten version of Clinton’s arguments fomented a sense of disregard of the Secretary-General’s claim: “to [simply] declare” and “in a brief allusion to that problem [of the UN member-States financing]” («**declarou, simplesmente, numa breve alusão a esse problema**»), leads one to (re)interpret his words as truly belonging to a *superpower*, i.e., as someone who is not to be blamed; rather, as someone who blames – in this case, the UN system in itself.

In the second paragraph, DN chose to mention Bill Clinton’s five initiatives against international problems, such as drug trafficking and terrorism. It did it by using the verb “to propose” («No seu discurso, Clinton **propôs** à comunidade internacional cinco iniciativas a fim de lutar contra a delinquência internacional, nomeadamente o tráfico de droga e o terrorismo»), which seems to sustain the reading just presented: the image of the US President not as someone to whom guidelines (or accusations) are presented, but as someone who takes the lead of (most of) the rest of the world leaders. In this case, it is interesting to notice that the object of such initiatives had to do with problems that would become very present in the years to come on the international agenda. This indicates, on the one hand, that such issues already in the mid-nineties were considered among the top priorities in the path toward international security, but, on the other, that were part of pragmatical views of the world – i.e., of actions needed to be taken by the full members of the UN (such as the US and the majority of the governmental representatives) – thus, were not associated to a permanent observer, such as the Holy See. Rather, as we have seen, to the Pope were associated issues most of all concerning moral ethics in the international scene, even though such a change in the governmental leaders’ views of other states needed to be materialized, according to John Paul II, in a document similar to the UDHR.

In the only paragraph dedicated to BORIS YELTSIN’s speech, Bosnia and Eastern Europe were part of the selected subjects. Even though they were also mentioned in the Pope’s rewritten version, the views promoted by DN regarding the leader of Catholicism and that of a very recent post-communist regime were substantially different: while in the former the reference promoted the Pope as an agent who was very considerably concerned with the lack of peace and the denial of human (national) rights, in Yeltsin’s the reference

had to do with an internal Russian problem – the menace that Yeltsin was foreseeing on the expansion of NATO near to the country’s borders («**alertou** para o perigo de ‘confronto’ que seria suscitado por um alargamento da Aliança Atlântica e **apelou** para um reforço do papel da ONU»). To the Russian President, such a circumstance could rise the peril of confrontation, which the verb “to alert” leads us to infer that it would be started by Russia («**alertou**»). Therefore, the rewrite of this passage in the whole promotes a sense of reactionary capacity, directly associated to military violence. Then, the verb “to appeal” («**apelou**») is another case of a pragmatic semantic formulation, given that sustains Yeltsin’s claim for a stronger role of the UN in respect to such a matter. Therefore, in this case, we perceive a characterization of the Russian leader as someone who is part of an international community, but who, within it, has specific opinions and views of the world. Most of all, as a leader who, instead of embracing a cooperation spirit, demanded attention to his own issues and interests – almost as an “outsider” on “the inside”. Finally, the reference “to affirm” («**afirmou** também que o seu país está pronto a participar numa força multinacional de paz na Bósnia») reinforces Russia’s formal willingness to help solving the conflict in Bosnia by military means, as part of a multinational peace force, but only on the basis of a rigorous mandate promulgated by the UN Security Council, as quoted by DN («mas somente sob um rigoroso mandato do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas’»). This promotes a character of the Russian leader simultaneously altruistic and egocentric: altruistic, regarding his willingness to help solving the conflict; egocentric, given that it foments the idea of Yeltsin’s wish to be first assured about the international community’s aims on that conflict before taking any action, which ultimately recalls the long discrepancies between the US and Russia/ URSS at the Security Council (cf. Ribeiro, 2016: 206), motivated by self-interests and a fierce need for international notoriousness.

4. 2015: Pope Francis, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin’s speeches at the UNGA

In 2015, when Pope Francis, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin spoke at the UNGA, the titles presented in DN show a clear difference between the three agents’ world views – a situation which is all the more significant for the speeches were delivered in very close moments: the Pope’s in September 25th (having the news piece been published on the 26th) and both Obama’s and Putin’s three days later, on September 28th (and the news piece on the day that followed). Once again, it is important to say that the piece about the two governmental leaders was integrated in a collective report – i.e., in one in which the

newspaper mentioned also other leaders' arguments before the UNGA. Yet, comparing to what we have seen in 1995, this time not only did the target text focus on Obama and Putin, but also their statements composed the most of the journalistic narrative: since the main title until almost half of the piece, plus other two paragraphs in lower layers of the inverted pyramid and one quotation of each in a text box.

In what concerns the subjects associated to each of the leaders, we see that, in the rewriting of POPE FRANCIS' arguments, DN chose to highlight several problems not just at the individual and governmental levels, but also concerned to the planet in the whole: on the main title, his opposition to the thirst of (political) power and his concerns about the environment («**contra** a sede de poder e **a favor** do ambiente»); on the second title, his congratulations about the nuclear deal with Iran («Líder dos católicos **elogiou** o acordo nuclear com o Irão»), as well as his criticism about the promotion of abnormal, irresponsible ways of being («E **criticou** os 'modelos de vida anormais e irresponsáveis'»); then, after two paragraphs with contextual information, a reinforcement of those subjects, namely in the Pope's mention of the correlation existing between bad political and economic management, socio-economic exclusion and the environmental crisis («**condenou** a 'ofensa grave' da exclusão económica e social: 'A sede egoísta e sem limites pelo poder e prosperidade material levam à má utilização dos recursos naturais e à exclusão dos fracos e desfavorecidos'»); his hope on the Paris Agreements about climate change («'[**É preciso que**] a conferência de Paris sobre as alterações climáticas obtenha acordos fundamentais e eficazes'»); and a further reference to the nuclear deal between the Western powers and Iran, considering it a proof of how political good will can achieve major progresses in human History («que **classificou** como 'prova do potencial da boa vontade'»). Furthermore, DN also chose to present the Pope's appeal to the governmental leaders to guarantee to their people the minimum material conditions for living («**pediu** também aos líderes mundiais **para que garantam** aos seus povos o mínimo de meios materiais para viver (...), disse, entre aplausos»); his reference to the silent, yet heavily mortal and global war such as the narcotics trade («**Condenando** 'a guerra assumida e debilmente combatida' do tráfico de droga, Francisco **salientou** também que se trata de 'um conflito que, em silêncio, provoca a morte de milhões de pessoas' (...) **denunciou**»); plus his mention to the ideological colonization («**deixou ainda uma crítica** à 'colonização ideológica'»), recovering the information promoted on the second title about

the abnormal ways of living, clarifying it in the last paragraph of the text as being related to gender theory and gay marriage (even though there is no explicit reference to neither themes in the Holy Father's source version, DN indicated it: «numa referência à teoria dos géneros e ao casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo») and associating to it Francis' argument that the international community should establish a moral law in the world, based on which natural distinction between man and women and full respect for life in all its dimensions and stages would be safeguarded – i.e., two main principles of the Divine Creation («**E pediu** às Nações Unidas **para que reconheçam** ‘uma lei moral inscrita na própria natureza humana, que inclui a distinção natural entre homem e mulher e o absoluto respeito pela vida em todas as suas fases e dimensões’»).

On the contrary, the article produced about both **BARACK OBAMA** and **VLADIMIR PUTIN** concentrates fundamentally on two aspects: first, on the historical political dispute among the two countries, also referring indirectly to a political difference between the US and Iran – a country that seemed to have been particularly taken into account by this newspaper, even though, in this case, the reference did not regard the nuclear question (as it happened in the rewriting of the Pope's speech), but with the war in Syria, which was a particularly focus of worriedness at a global level, not only due to the violence and human suffering, but also to the beginning of a worldwide crisis that is still today a delicate political issue: the refugees from the global South to the global North. This war and, more generally, the war against the Islamic State, was precisely the second major topic on the rewrite of Obama's and Putin's speeches. The fact that they were both promoted in the front-cover title, in the main title inside the edition, on the lead and on the first three paragraphs, sustains that both leaders were represented fundamentally as political agents and, mainly, as internationally important and influent entities – to such an extent that the solution of a foreign affair and the measures towards a global menace such as the Islamic State were presented as deriving from these two presidents' decisions. Therefore, and because the news piece was focused on Obama and Putin, not on other heads of State, they were represented as *the world's superpowers* – so recalling the Cold War division.

However, we can identify some singularities on the portray of one and the other: in what concerns Barack Obama, it is perceivable a representation of him as *the* major world political leader, given that in both the front-cover and the interior title, the focus was put on him – as we can see in the indication “Obama accepts dialogue with Putin and Tehran to

end the war in Syria” («**Obama aceita** diálogo com **Putin** e **Teerão** para acabar com guerra na Síria») next to the large, coloured photograph on the front-cover, where the President of the US is being greeted by the Portuguese president at the time, Cavaco Silva. That same prevalence of the US leader is repeated on the interior title, which is rather similar to the former. It is, however, worth noticing that, on the front-cover, while the Russian leader was referred to by this name, the Iran president was mentioned indirectly, by means of a metonymy established by the capital’s name.³ This seems to reinforce the idea of a dual (not third-partly) governmental international dispute, being Putin the second most important in the report of the political speeches delivered at this UNGA session. In terms of subjects, to Obama were associated the ideas of dialogue and work with other countries (i.e., Russia and Iran) in order to solve the war in Syria; yet, refusing to keep in power the “tyran” Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. On the contrary, Putin’s first translated argument was that in which he sees Assad as the only solution to defeat the Islamic State – words that seem to have been presented as counter-arguments to Obama’s statement, so reinforcing the stronger emphasis on the US leader («Obama **recusou** manter no poder o ‘tirano’ Assad. Putin **garantiu** que presidente sírio é única solução para derrotar o Estado islâmico»). Having such opposition of political ideals been presented on the lead, we consider it as the first highlight of the ideological-political dispute portrayed in DN’s text. Then, on the first and second paragraphs, we find a second dispute: besides giving notice of Obama’s recognition that the US cannot solve the world problems alone and reinforcing his willingness to negotiate with (enemies such as) the Russian and Iranian presidents to solve the Syrian conflict – so, a positive view of international relations, presenting a sense of disregard of long-term conflictual positions for the sake of a higher good: the safety of the Syrian people –, DN counter-presents Putin’s ideal of fomenting a coalition against terrorism, similar to the arrangement elaborated during the Second World War to defeat Adolf Hitler – in this case, an ideal that recalls a profoundly negative episode of contemporary History («O presidente americano (...) **admitiu** que os EUA ‘não conseguem resolver os problemas sozinhos’ e **disse-se disposto a trabalhar** com qualquer nação ‘incluindo Rússia e Irão para resolver o conflito’ na Síria. Já Putin **defendeu** a criação de uma coligação contra o terrorismo semelhante à formada para derrotar Hitler na Segunda Guerra Mundial»). The third dispute concerned the Russian annexation of the

³ The case of the interior title is not mentioned in this comparison, since in this case all leaders – including Barack Obama – were referred to by the country’s name, thus on an equal foot.

Crimea, in 2014. The rewriting (and rearrangement) of both leaders' words in the target text resulted in the following interpretation: turning explicit that Vladimir Putin was referring to the US (“Without referring directly to America” - «Sem se referir diretamente à América») –, DN highlighted (i) the Russian president's accusation of the US government(s) about the destabilization in the Middle East, aggravated with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 («**lembrou** que o Estado Islâmico ganhou força após a invasão do Iraque, em 2003, e continua a expandir-se»); (ii) his blame of the North-American policies about how to fight jihadists, which uncoordinated character was, in his view, on the basis of the panorama that caused the immense flow of migrants that was troubling Europe at the time («**defendeu** maior coordenação na luta contra os jihadistas. E **garantiu** que se esta existisse, não eram necessários campos de refugiados, **denunciando** a ‘grande e trágica migração de povos’ com que a Europa está a lidar»); and (iii) his condemnation of the US supremacy in the world after the Cold War period («**criticou** que desde a Guerra Fria ‘apenas um centro de domínio tenha emergido no mundo’») – an argument which was put into relation to this leader's criticism about the expansion of NATO towards the East («**Queixando-se** da expansão da NATO para Leste, Putin **criticou** a ‘lógica de confronto’ que, segundo ele, levou à crise na Ucrânia e ao que definiu como o ‘golpe militar’ coordenado a partir do estrangeiro que resultou numa guerra civil»), as well as to his condemnation for the “unilateral sanctions” (i.e., from the US) Russia was submitted to due to the Crimea annexation («**sublinhou**: ‘Sanções unilaterais vão contra os princípios das Nações Unidas»). To these arguments, DN presented Obama's view that the US could not stand while “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation was flagrantly violated” («**garantira** que os EUA não podiam ficar quietos quando ‘a soberania e integridade territorial de uma nação é violada de forma flagrante’»), and that sanctions were deemed necessary to avoid a precedent, that would allow violations alike in any UN nation («E **explicou** que se não houver consequências para a Rússia depois da anexação da Crimeia, então pode acontecer o mesmo a qualquer país da ONU»).

All in all, we can see that DN's piece about the two governmental leaders was based on current events – such as the war in Syria, the Ukrainian conflict, the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the refugees crisis –, but it mostly promoted mutually-directed accusations, which fundamentally have shown that twenty-six years after the end of the Cold War both leaders still fomented a fierce antagonism. The verbs signalled in bold turn

it quite clear – especially “to defend”, “to denounce”, “to recall”, “to guarantee”, “to underline”, “to criticise”, “to complain” and “to explain”, all of which denounce a sense of self-confidence and of confrontation, thus an enhancement of the “Us” against the “Other”. In turn, the rewriting of Pope Francis’ speech fomented a representation of the Holy Father as an agent concerned about several problems that were prejudicing the international scene – and we would argue that not just at the specific time (as we could consider the aggravation of the environmental crisis or the narcotics global trade), but throughout History (namely, the nuclear menace, the concern with over-power management and socioeconomic exclusion). We also understand in DN’s portray of the Pope a sense of a leader who was not only respected, for most of the arguments were presented to the public in direct speech, but was also regarded as standing in a more elevated level of the global society. This consideration comes from the simultaneous presentation of calls to governmental responsibility towards social issues, criticism of divergent behaviour in the eyes of the Catholic Church, condemnation of governmental power and rapid economic private growth, defence of the most vulnerable and of the environment, and congratulation of positive international diplomacy achievements, hoping that they could be kept in the long-run, as well as serve as examples for further cases. All this was reinforced by the verbs (also signalled in bold), as well as by references presented by DN, such as “another recall to the audience” («outro dos recados para a plateia») or “he said, among applause” («disse, entre aplausos»). Ultimately, we perceive in such a rewriting the characterization of an hybrid role – which, in truth, goes along with the hybridity of the papal diplomatic role in itself: simultaneously religious and political (cf. Troy, 2018), meaning that the Holy character of the Pope determines the manifestation of a spiritual, guiding role of the secular leaders, while, at the same time, his political character allows him to be part of the international community, manifesting his (and the Church’s) regard about the state of the world at each moment of time.

5. Final remarks

When we think of humanity from the last decade of the 20th century until today, we may recall the very significant changes verified at individual, social and professional levels as a result of the (continuously) new information technologies, from which the internet, which turned the vast world into a global village. But to describe the recent past is necessarily to remember a very important episode of human History which changed the

world dramatically: the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and with it the extinction of the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain, in 1991. Even though it represented individual freedom, national economic progress and the implementation of a free-trade system at an international scale, it was also a time of *uncertainty*, in the sense that the international community was still learning how to act before (and to think about) the new world order, especially in what concerned the territory that for approximately forty years was kept behind an ideological curtain. Indeed, despite it was no longer divided in two major blocs, long-implemented ideologies have deeply influenced the understanding of international life, depending on a nation's position in the global map. Recent studies have started to point out that, in truth, that former period of History should be called "*Cultural Cold War*", given that it is "now widely accepted that the Cold War had as much to do with 'winning hearts and minds' as it did with the arms race." (Risso, 2014: 10). This definition seems to be appropriate to summarize this study, for it considers the prominent binomial dispute by the two major superpowers during almost half a century as an ideological one, as well as a mindset which has determinately shaped humanity in the whole ("winning [people's] hearts and minds") – therefore, a cultural phenomenon. Yet, we would argue that it should not be used to describe the past only, rather to be applied also to the present.

At least, from the Portuguese perspective, we believe that this study has shown that the press has been fomenting a perpetuation of cultural models implemented in a very different national and international environment from those existing nowadays. Indeed, either in the mid-nineties of the 20th century or in the second decade of the 21st century, one of the most prestigious newspapers in the country presented signs of a pre-existing ideological background, regarding three very different worldviews: (i) the Pope while the supreme head of Catholicism, having been noticeable that the Holy Father is still represented as an esteemed, important leader, as it was sustained during Estado Novo, with both a spiritual character and a political ability of guiding, from an upper position, the governmental representatives; (ii) in regard to capitalism, we have identified a portray of the Presidents of the United States as *the* major actors in the international arena, a situation which seems to go along with Portugal's geopolitical position and to its transition to the democratic regime and the capitalist economic system at the final decades of the 20th century, mostly in order to avoid a communist influence; and (iii), in what concerns the two post-Cold War Russian presidents considered, the analysis showed that DN tended to

promote an image of them as counter-agents, i.e., as leaders who mostly reacted to actions of their country's historical opponent (the US, as it was particularly clear in 2015) or who threatened to react to political menaces namely when conducted by Western countries, from which the US (as we have seen mainly in 1995).

If we would put it on a scale, ranging from the most to the less ideologically closer leader – that is, from the “Us” to the “Other” – based on the results found, we would argue that the first stage would be occupied by the Catholic Pope, the second by the US capitalist presidents and the third by the post-communist Russian presidents. This disposition symbolizes the Portuguese identity and the fact that DN helped to sustain it throughout the years leads us to confirm that, in the Portuguese context, the news articles produced about such important moments in global politics as the UNGA manifested an exercise of both the press' role of informing the general public about major leaders' worldviews at the time and its role of *reconstructing* the reality. This study allowed us to perceive that journalists are not influenced only by the editorial ideology of the media to which they belong to. Rather, the fact that they belong to a sociocultural community also plays a part. Indeed, if the newsworthiness of a leader might be defined by what is happening in the world and the major agents involved, the way they are represented in the news texts has much to do with factors that cannot be casuistically explained. On the contrary, we believe that what is chosen to present and to highlight to the public from a broader range of arguments pronounced by a world leader – especially in an official event in which global issues are to be discussed – results from an unconscious dimension on the news making processes. In particular, the target context's own history and cultural identity ought to influence the source agents' representation in terms of cultural affinity or cultural detachment (i.e., by the notions of “Us” and the “Other”). Ultimately, the perpetuation of such representations throughout the years allows social agents (in this case, the press) to reduce the sense of *uncertainty* of living in the global village, because the cultural models upon which people in general rely on – and which are fomented in the press – sustain long-implemented perspectives, thus a stable (i.e., certain) sense of identity.

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